Further References

These references supplement the „Further Reading“ list of each chapter, and contain work referred to at some point in the presentation. Items of the „Further Reading“ section are mostly not listed again here.


Aczel, Peter (1988). Non-Well-Founded Sets. Stanford.

Akama, Seiki (1998). "Nelson´s Paraconsistent Logics", manuscript, 12 pp. (read at the Stanislaw Jaskowski Memorial Symposium, Torun, 1998).

Al-Hibri, Azizah (1978). Deontic Logic. Washington.

Allen, Martin (2004). Complexity Results for Some Logics of Inconsistent Belief. Manuscript, University of Massachusetts.

Alves, Elias (1992). "The First Axiomatization of a Paraconsistent Logic", Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 21, pp. 19-20.

Anderson, Alan/Belnap, Nuel/Dunn, Michael (1992). Entailment. The Logic of Rele­vance and Necessity. Princeton, Vol. II 1992.

Aqvist, Lennart (1987). Introduction to Deontic Logic and the Theory of Normative Systems. Neapels.

Armour-Garb, Bradley/Beall, J.C. (2003). “Minimalism and the Dialetheic Challenge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, pp. 383-401.

Arruda, Ayda (1989). "Aspects of the Historical Development of Paraconsistent Logic", in: Priest/Routley/Norman (1989), pp. 99-130.

      -/da Costa, Newton (1984). "On the Relevant Systems P and P* and Some Related Systems", Studia Logica, pp. 33-49.

Batens, Diderik (1989). "Dynamic Dialectical Logics", in: Priest/Routley/Normann (1989), pp. 187-217.

Batens, Diderik et. al. (1999). (Eds.) Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic. Baldock.

Barwise, Jon/Moss, Lawrence (1996). Vicious Circles. On the Mathematics of Non-Wellfounded Phenomena. Stanford.

Barwise, Jon/Seligman, Jerry (1997). Information Flow. The Logic of Distributed Systems. Cambridge.

Beall, J.C. (2003). (Ed) Liars and Heaps. Oxford.

      - /van Fraasen, Bas (2003). Possibilities and Paradox. An Introduction to Modal and Many-Valued Logic. Oxford.

Ben-Ari, M. (1993). Mathematical Logic for Computer Science, New York et. al.

Benassi, Corrado/Gentilini, Paolo (2003). “Paraconsistent Provability Logic and Rational Epistemic Agents”, manuscript, 38 pp. (read at the Third World Congress on Paraconsistency, Toulouse, 2003).

Bendegem, Jean van (1993). "The Strong Hilbert Program", Revue International Philosophie, 47, pp. 343-53.

Bender, John (1989). (Ed.) The Current State of the Coherence Theory. Critical Essays on the Epis­temic Theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence BonJour with Replies. Dordrecht et al.

Bentham, Jeremy van (1979). "What is Dialectical Logic?", Erkenntnis, 14, pp. 333-47.

Berk, Lon (2003). “Why the Liar Does Not Matter”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32, pp. 323-41.

Besnard, Philippe (1989). An Introduction to Default Logic. Berlin.

Beziau, Jean-Yves (1995).  "Universal Logic", in: Childers, T./Majer, O. (Eds.) Logica ’94. Prague, 1995, pp. 73-94.

      - (2002). „Are Paraconsistent Negations Negations?“, in:

      (Carnielli/Coniglio/D’Ottavanio 2002), pp.465-86.

      - (2005). (Ed.) Logica Universalis. Basel/Boston/Bern.

Blau, Ulrich (1978). Die dreiwertige Logik der Sprache. Berlin/New York.

Bloesch, Anthony (1993). "A Tableau Style Proof System for Two Paraconsistent Logics", Notre Dame Journal of Symbolic Logic, pp. 295-301.

Bochvar, D. (1939). On a Three-Valued Calculus and Its Application to the Analysis of Contradictories”, Mathematceskij Sbornik, 4, pp. 287-308.

BonJour, Laurence (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambrige MA/London.

Boolos, George/Jeffrey, Richard (1989). Computability and Logic.  Cambridge, 3rd Ed.

Brady, Ross (1984). "Depth Relevance of Some Paraconsistent Logics", Studia Logica.

      - (1996). „Relevant implication and the case for a weaker logic“, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25, pp.151-83.

- (2000). „Entailment, Negation and Paradox Resolution“, in: Batens et al. (2000),


- (2006). Universal Logic. Stanford.

Bremer, Manuel (1998). Wahre Widersprüche. Einführung in die parakonsistente Logik.

Sankt Augustin.
- (1999). “Can Contradictions Be Asserted?”, Logic and Logical Philosophy, 7, pp. 167-77.

- (1999a). “Truth in Internal Realism“, in: Nida-Rümelin, Julian (Ed.). Rationality, Realism and Revision, Paderborn.

- (1999b). “Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, pp. 111-32.

- (2000). “Wahrheit im Internen Realismus“, Philosophisches Jahrbuch, pp.30-46.
- (2000a). „Possibilia. Notwendig, möglich – oder überflüssig?“, Metaphysica, Special Issue 1, pp. 49-72.

- (200x). “Believing and Asserting Contradictions”, (see : www.mbph.de)

- (200y). “Transcendental Logic’s New Clothes”, (see: www.mbph.de)

Brendel, Elke (1992). Die Wahrheit über den Lügner. Eine philosophisch-logische Analyse der Antinomie des Lügners. Berlin/New York.

Brewka, Gerhard (1991). Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Logical Foundations of Commonsense. Cambridge.

Bromand, Joachim (2001). Philosophie der semantischen Paradoxien. Paderborn.

Bueno, Otávio (2002). “Can a Paraconsistent Theorist Be a Logical Monist?”, in: (Carnielli/Coniglio/Ottavanio 2002), pp. 525-51.

Caleiro, Carlos/Carnielli, Walter/Coniglio, Marcelo/Marcos, Joao (2005). “Two’s Company: ‘The Humbug of Many Logical Values’”, in: (Beziau 2005), pp. 169-89.

Calvanese, Diego et al. (2005). “Inconsistency Tolerance in P2P Data Integration: An Epistemic Logic Approach”, DBPL, LNCS 3774, pp. 90-105.

Carnap, Rudolf (1933). Die logische Syntax der Sprache. Wien.

Carnielli, Walter (2000). „Possible-Translation Semantics for Paraconsistent Logics“, in: (Batens et. al. 2000), pp. 149-64.

- /Coniglio, Marcelo/D’Ottavanio, Itala (2002). (Eds.) Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent. New York/Basel.

      - /Marcos, Joao (2002). „A Taxonomy of C-sytems“, in: (Carnielli/Coniglio/D’Ottavanio 2002), pp.1-94.

Cherniak, Christopher (1986). Minimal Rationality. Cambridge/MA.

Church, Alonzo (1974). „Set Theory with a Universal Set“, Proceedings of Symposia in Pure Mathematics, 25, pp.297-308.

DaCosta, Newton (1974). „On the Theory of Inconsistent Formal Systems“, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 15, pp. 497-510.

Davidson, Donald (1967). „Truth and Meaning“, Synthese, 17, pp.304-23.

Decker, Hendrik (2005). “A Case for Paraconsistent Logic as Foundation of Future Information Systems.”, CAiSE Workshops (2) 2005, pp. 451-461.

Devlin, Keith (1991). Logic and Information. Cambridge/MA.

Easterbrook, Steve/Chechik, Marsha (2001). “Automated Paraconsistent Reasoning via Model Checking”, Proceedings, First International Workshop on Inconsistency in Data and Knowledge, at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, (IJCAI-01), Seattle, USA.

Epstein, Richard (1995). The Semantic Foundations of Logic. Propositional Logics. New York, 2nd Edition.

Essler, Wilhelm/Martinez, Rosa (1991). Grundzüge der Logik. Vol. I. Das Schließen. Frankfurt a.M., 4th Ed.

Everett, Anthony (1993). "A Note on Priest´s 'Hypercontradictions'", Logique et Analyse, pp. 39-43

Field, Harty (2003). „A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes“, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32, pp. 139-77.

Fuhrmann, Andre (1985). "Ein relevanzlogischer Dialogkalkül Erster Stufe", Conceptus, 19, pp. 51-65.

      - (1991). "Theory Contraction Through Base Contraction", Jour­nal of Philosophical Logic, 20.

Gärdenfors, Peter (1988). Knowledge in Flux. Cambridge/MA.

Geach, Peter (1954/55). "On Insolubilia", Analysis, 15.

Gentzen, G. (1934/35). "Untersuchungen über das logische Schließen", Mathemati­sche Zeitschrift, pp.176-210, pp. 405-31.

Gibbins, P. (1981). „Putnam on the Two-Slit Experiment“, Erkenntnis, 16, pp. 235-41.

Goble, Lou (2001). (Ed.) The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Oxford.

Goldblatt, Robert (1992). Logics of Time and Computation. Standford, 2nd Ed.

Goodship, Laura (1996). "On Dialethism", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74.

Grim, Patrick (1991). The Incomplete Universe. Totality, Knowledge and Truth. Cambridge/MA.

Günther, Arnold (1995). "Paradoxien und parakonsistente Logiken", Zeitschrift für Semiotik, 17, pp. 379-403.

Hack, Susan (1978). Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge et al.

Harman, Gilbert (1986). Change in View. Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge/MA.

Hintikka, Jaakko (1970). “Surface Information and Depth Information”, in: Hintikka, J.

/Suppes, P. (eds.) Information and Inference. Dordrecht.

        - (1973). Logic, Language-Games and Information. Oxford.

Hughes, G./Cresswell, M. (1990). An Introduction to Modal Logic. London/New York, 7th Ed.

Hunter, Geoffrey (1996). Metalogic. An Introduction to the Metatheory of Stan­dard First Order Logic. Berkeley, 6th Ed.

Jacquette, Dale (2002). (Ed.) A Companion to Philosophical Logic. Oxford.

Jaskowski, S. (1969). "Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems", Studia Logica, 24, pp. 143-57.

Kaplan, David/Montague, Richard (1960). "A Paradox Regained", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1, pp. 79-90.

Koons, Robert (1992). Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality. Cam­bridge/MA.

Kripke, Saul (1975). "Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy, 72, pp. 690-716.

Lambert, Karel (1983). Meinong and the Principle of Independence. Cambridge et al.

      - (1991). (Ed.) Philosophical Applications of Free Logic. New York/Oxford.

Lavine, Stephen (1998). Understanding the Infinite. Cambridge/MA, 2nd Ed.

Lenzen, Wolfgang (1980). Glauben, Wissen und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Systeme der epistemischen Logik. Berlin/New York.

Levesque, Hector (1984). „A Logic of Implicit and Explicit Belief“, AAAI-84, pp. 198-202.

Lorenzen, Paul/Lorenz, Kuno (1978). Dialogische Logik. Darmstadt.

Marcos, Jaao (2005). Logics of Formal Inconsistency. Campinas.

Meheus, Joke (2002) (Ed.). Inconsistency in Science. Dordrecht.

Meyer, R./Slaney, J. (1989). "Abelian Logic (from A to Z)", in: Priest/Routley/Norman (1989), pp. 259-71.

Miller, Arthur (2002). „Inconsistent Reasoning Towards Consistent Theories“, in: Meheus (2002), pp. 35-41.

Milne, Peter (1996). "On Tennant´s Intuitionist Relevant Logics", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, pp. 175-81.

Moore, A.W. (1990). The Infinite. London/New York.

Nelson, David (1949). "Constructible Falsity", The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 14, pp. 16-26.

      - (1959). "Negation and Separation of Concepts in Constructive Systems", in: Heyting, A. (Ed.) Constructivity in Mathematics. Amsterdam, pp. 208-25.

Pardey, Ulrich (1994). Identität, Existenz und Reflexivität. Weinheim.

Paoli, Francesco (2003). „Quine and Slater on Paraconsistency and Deviance“, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32, pp. 531-48.

Pena, Lorenzo (1996). „Graham Priest’s ‚Dialectheism’ – Is it Altogether True?“, Sorites.

Petersen, Uwe (1992). "Dialetheism and Paradoxes of the Berry Family", Logique et Analyse, pp. 273-89.

Popov, V.K. (1988). "Paraconsistent Sequential Caluculi", Bulletin of the Section of Logic, pp. 148-59.

Putnam, Hilary (1968). „Is Logic Empirical?“, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 5.

Priest, Graham (1979). "The Logic of Paradox", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, pp. 219-41.

      - (1980). "Sense, Entailment and Modus Ponens", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 9, pp. 415-35.

      - (1982). "To Be and Not to Be: Dialectical Tense Logic", Studia Logica, pp. 249-68.

      - (1984). "Hyper-Contradictions", Logique et Analyse, 27, pp. 237-43.

      - (1984a). "Semantic Closure", Studia Logica, pp. 117-29.

      - (1987). In Contradiction. A Study of the Transconsistent. Dordrecht.

      - (1989). "Reductio ad Absurdum et Modus Tollendo Ponens", in: Priest/Routley/Norman (1989), pp. 613-626.

      - (1991). "Intensional Paradoxes", Notre Dame Journal of Symbolic Logic, 32, pp. 193-211.

      - (1991a). "Minimally Inconsistent LP", Studia Logica, 50, pp. 321-33.

      - (1993). "Can Contradictions Be True", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, pp. 35-54.

      - (1994). "Is Arithmetic Consistent?", Mind, 103, pp. 337-49.

- (1994a). “What Could the Least Inconsistent Number Be?”, Logique et Analyse, 145,


      - (1995). Beyond the Limits of Thought. Cambridge.

      - (1996). "Everett´s Triology", Mind, 105, pp. 631-48.

- (1996a). "On Inconsistent Arithmetics: A Reply to Denyer", Mind, 105, pp. 649-59.
- (1997). “Inconsistent Models of Arithmetic. Part I: Finite Models”, Journal of Phi­losophical Logic, 26, pp. 223-35.

- (1997a). “On a Paradox of Hilbert and Bernays”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26,

pp. 45-56.

- (1999). “Semantic Closure, Descriptions and Non-Triviality”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, pp. 549-58.

- (2000). “Could Everything Be True?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, pp. 189-95.

- (2001). An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic. Cambridge.

- (2002). “Inconsistency and the Empirical Sciences”, in: Meheus (2002), pp. 119-28.

      -/Routley,Richard (1983). On Paraconsistency. Reserach Report 13. Australian National University.

      -/Routley, Richard/Norman, Jean (1989). (Eds.) Paraconsistent Logic. Es­says on the Inconsistent. Munich et al.

Quine, Willard Van Orman (1937). „Logic based on inclusion and abstraction“, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 2.

      - (1963). Set Theory and its Logic. Cambridge/MA.

      - (1974). Methods of Logic. London, 3rd Edition.

Rescher, Nicholas (1979). Cognitive Systematization. Oxford.

      - /Brandom, R. (1980). The Logic of Inconsistency. A Study in Non-Stan­dard Possible Worlds Semantics and Ontology. Oxford.

Restall, Greg (1992). “Arithmetic and Truth in Lukasiewicz’s Infinitely Valued Logic”, Logique et Analyse, 139, pp. 303-12.

      - (2000). An Introduction to Substructural Logics. London/New York.

Routley, Richard (1978). "Semantical Analysis of Arruda-da Costa P Systems and Adjacent Non-Replacement Relevant Systems", Studia Logica, pp. 301-20.

      - (1979). "Dialectical Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics", Erkenntnis, 14, pp. 301-31.

      - (1979a). Exploring Meinong´s Jungle and Beyond. Canberra.

      -/Brady, Ross (1989). "The Non-Triviality of Extensional Dialectical Set Theory", in: Priest/Routley/Norman (1989), pp. 415-36.

      -/Loparic, A. (1980). "Relevant Logics Without Replacement", in: Ar­ruda, A./Da Costa, N./Sette, A. (Eds.) Proceedings of the Third Brasi­lian Conference on Mathematical Logic. Estadual de Campinas, pp. 263-80.

      -/Meyer, J. (1976). "Dialectical logic, classical logic and the consistency of the world", Studies in Soviet Thought, 16.

      -/Plumwood, V. (1989). "Moral Dilemmas and the Logic of Deontic Notions", in: Priest/Routley/Norman (1989), pp. 653-90.

Russell, Bertrand (1905). „On Some Difficulties in the Theory of Transfinite Numbers and

Order Types“, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 4, pp.29-53.

Sainsbury, R. (1988). Paradoxes. Cambridge.
Schotch, P./Jennings, R. (1989). „On Detonating“, in: Priest/Routley/Norman (1989), pp. 306-


Schurz, Gerhard (1991). „Relevant Deduction“, Erkenntnis, 35, pp.391-437.

Shapiro, Steward (1991). Foundations without Foundationalism. A Case for Second-Order Logic. Oxford.

Sidorenko, Evgenij (1997). "Binary Relational Semantics of Entailment", manuscript, 7 pp.

Slater, B. (1995). "Paraconsistent Logics?", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24, pp. 451-54.

Smiley, Timothy (1993). "Can Contradictions Be True?", Proceedings of the Ari­stotelian Society, pp. 16-33.

Smullyan, Raymond (1992). Gödel´s Incompleteness Theorems. Oxford/New York.

Sneed, Joseph (1979). The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics. Dordrecht, 2nd Ed.

Stalnaker, Robert (1968). "A Theory of Conditionals", Studies in Logical Theory, American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph 2, pp. 98-112.

Stein, E (1996). Without Good Reason. The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Oxford.

Stegmüller, Wolfgang (1986). Die Entwicklung des neuen Strukturalismus. Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie, Bd. II, Dritter Teilband. Berlin et al.

Stoll, Robert (1963). Set Theory and Logic. New York, 2nd Ed.

Straßburger, Lutz (2005). “What is Logic, and What is a Proof?”, in (Beziau 2005), pp.135-48.

Sylvan, Richard (1992). "Grim Tales Retold: How to Maintain Ordinary Discourse About - and Despite - Logically Embarassing Notions and Totali­ties", Logique et Analyse, pp. 349-74.

Tarski, Alfred (1936). „Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen“, Studia Philosophica, 1.

Tennant, Neil (1984). "Perfect Validity, Entailment and Paraconsistency", Studia Logica

      - (1987). Anti-Realism and Logic. Truth as Eternal. Oxford.

      - (1992). Natural Logic. Edinburgh, 3rd Ed.

Thagard, Paul (1978). “The Best Explanation. Criteria for Theory Choice”, The Journal of Philoso­phy, 75, pp.76-92.

Urchs, Max (1995). "Discursive Logic: Towards a Logic of Rational Discourse", Studia

      Logica, 54, pp. 231-49.

van Inwagen, Peter (1995). God, Knowledge, and Mystery. Essays in Philosophical Theology.

Ithaca/London (Cornell University Press).

Weingartner, Paul (1999). „Reasons for Filtering Classical Logic“, in: Batens et. al. (1999),

pp. 315-28.

White, Richard (1979). “The Consistency of the Axiom of Comprehension in the Infinite-Valued Predicate Logic of Lukaciewicz”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, pp. 509-34.

Wolenski, Jan (1995). „Logic and Falsity“, in: Childers, T./Majer, O. (Eds.) Logica ’94. Prague, 1995, pp. 95-106.

Woods, John (2003). Paradox and Paraconsistency. Conflict Resolution in the Abstract Sciences. Cambridge.

      - (2005). “Dialectical Considerations on the Logic of Contradictions:         Part I”, Logic Journal of the ICPL, 13, pp.231-60.

Wormell, C. (1958). "On the Paradoxes of Self-Reference", Mind, 67.

Yablo, Stephen (1993). "Paradoxes without Self-Reference", Analysis, 53, pp. 251-52.

- (2003). “New Grounds for Naïve Truth Theory”, in: (Beall 2003).