

Epilogue



$p \wedge \neg p$

Manuel Bremer
Centre for Logic,
Language and
Information

HEINRICH HEINE
UNIVERSITÄT
DUSSELDORF

- This introduction has covered several fields in which paraconsistency is explored and developed. We have seen its merits, but also some problems and unsolved questions in these areas. Paraconsistent logics are more and more becoming an acceptable tool of work in the formal sciences and in modelling in the cognitive sciences and philosophy. With that development the fields of application are increasing.
- Problems so far unresolved or difficult to approach in meta-ethics or epistemology may gain from a fresh look from the paraconsistent perspective – not to speak of semantics and meta-logic itself.
- The major decisions to be made are:
 1. deciding one goes for a pluralism of logics from the different camps of paraconsistency or one tries to give a unified treatment of consistency related topics with one universally applied logic.
 2. deciding which of the approaches within paraconsistency seems to be on the one hand the most promising and on the other hand the one that keeps closest to our (philosophical) intuitions.

See the Evil in Beauty

- Standard logic is dear to most raised in it and realising the beauty of its proofs and the naturalness of much of its semantics.
- First Order Logic and (some) realism is where many philosopher's heart rests.
- Even the limitative theorems of meta-logic are revealing insights about language and logic then.
- Wait – are they really? Here the problems start. We are not talking about language in general here, we get messed up in the troubles of the hierarchies of ever higher meta-languages without even being able to state either something (semantic) about logic and language *in general* or merely explaining what *we are doing* at the moment.
- Our fascination with beauty now put into question we see more problems around: Is the material conditional the natural conditional after all? Is it really true that we cannot believe something inconsistent without falling into triviality immediately?
- And then: Has beauty blinded us to forego one set for each condition? Isn't there not just one universal set of truths dealing with everything?



$p \wedge \neg p$

Manuel Bremer
Centre for Logic,
Language and
Information

HEINRICH HEINE

UNIVERSITÄT
DUISBURG
ESSEN

See the Beauty in Evil



$p \wedge \neg p$

Manuel Bremer
Centre for Logic,
Language and
Information

HEINRICH HEINE
UNIVERSITÄT
DÜSSELDORF

- Hearing of true contradictions for the first time may make your mind boggle: How could anyone believe this? Hasn't she falling through the rock bottom of rationality? – and so on.
- Believing in true contradictions – further on – has an embarrassing tradition in philosophy, theories one rather does not associate with.
- Nevertheless, if you are (some) realist and given you stick to universality in logic and semantics – against the luring of first order beauties – then you take what you get by this: dialetheism.
- One of the deeper meta-insights on philosophy is: Every philosophical system has its quandaries and implausibilities, the only question is *where* they are located.
- The aim of this introduction was to argue that paraconsistency in general – and dialetheism especially – has the better overall coherence than does a thorough going adherence to standard logic.
- So now that you have gone over the edge into the abyss of logical evil, revel in it!