

Radical Interpretation, Normativity, And Analyticity

In this essay I argue that the construction of the semantics of a language L_1 by a theory of truth for L_1 which results from radical interpretation leads to analytical statements in L_1 . The reasons for this concern the manner in which the theory of truth is established empirically and the form of the resulting theory.

Davidson's theory of radical interpretation adopts the denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction (with the exception of statements of logic). But radical interpretation differs from Quine's radical translation in the way in which the theory of truth for some language is to be constructed. Normative considerations play a role in establishing attributions of meaning to utterances (§2).¹

In connection with the distinction between informative and non-informative equivalences of the form " p is true in $L_1 \equiv p$ " this will have consequences (§3). If we understand radical interpretation as a reconstruction of the theory of truth and meaning and orient ourselves to its normative character, we have to ask whether it incorporates postulates. The differences we find in the foundations of radical interpretation versus Quinian radical translation lead to the reintroduction of analytical statements in the narrow sense (§4).

Having made use of the notion of rule-following in §2 and having explained meaning and analyticity with it in §4, we have to face the Wittgensteinian critique that it seems to lead to a vicious regress to explain the meaning of statements by other statements (§5). So in the last paragraph (§6) it is argued that the regress of rule-following is harmless and that our model of rule-following is, therefore, simpler than the assumptions a Wittgensteinian has to make.

1) The paper is not intended as an interpretation of Davidson's views, but as taking a Davidsonian starting point in the theory of meaning (which I assume to be right) to see what it leads us to (vis. to something which (most) Davidsonians won't like).

§1 The foundations of radical interpretation

Davidson's theory of radical interpretation is based on the correlation of meaning and truth conditions by taking this correlation as the starting point of a theory of meaning. Such a recursive theory of meaning has to be of such a form that for any statement "p" of L_1 an equivalence of the form

$$(T) \text{ "p" is true in } L_1 \equiv q.$$

can be derived. In (T) "'p'" is the mention of "p" in the metalanguage and "q" is a statement of the truth conditions of "p" in L_1 within the metalanguage of L_1 . To avoid the semantic paradoxes we start with a non-semantic fragment of L_1 , whereby the metalanguage may be this fragment enriched with semantical expressions and names of the object language expressions. In case of such a metalanguage we speak of a homolingual theory of meaning: The metalanguage is an enrichment of the object language, and the expressions of the object language are translated into themselves.

How can we establish such a theory of meaning? To give the meaning of the statements of a language L_1 we have to give the truth conditions of these statements. According to the model of radical translation: we translate the statements of L_1 into statements of L_2 which give the truth conditions for L_1 . To do this we look at the linguistic behaviour of the speakers of L_1 , since that is all that any speaker of L_1 ever has access to.²

§2 The normative assumptions of radical interpretation

Davidson's theory of radical interpretation, which starts with the Quinian scenario and shares the neglect of an analytic/synthetic distinction (with the exception of logical truths), differs in the way in which the (T)-equivalences of the basis vocabulary of L_1 , with which the recursion starts, are established. That element of content which enables us to translate L_1 into L_2 is according to Quine not an

2) cf. Quine, *Word and Object*, Chap.2.

intension or a meaning in the traditional sense but stimulus meaning. But this specification of the empirical content of expressions doesn't lead us very far. On the one hand we have the difficulty that the interpreter has no knowledge of the irritations on the nerve endings of the person opposite. So this theory of interpretation is not applicable, neither in verbal interaction nor in Quine's example of the anthropologist. As a matter of fact an interpreter rather proceeds by correlating the statements to be interpreted with the situational conditions he perceives (i.e. with his perceptions and not with his physiological states). He uses, according to the "principle of charity" (that the speakers to be interpreted are willing and able to speak the truth) something like the following scheme:

- (1) (i) As utterance "p" in L_1 is true.
- (ii) q.
- (iii) As utterance "p" is true in $L_1 \equiv q$.

By changing constellations and factors the interpreter will form hypotheses concerning which perceptions might be connected with which semantic content:

As a radical interpreter I correlate verbal responses of a speaker with changes in the environment. Inferring a causal relation, I then translate those verbal responses with a sentence of my own that the same change in the environment cause me to accept or reject.³

This method can bring about the understanding of L_1 that we miss when starting with stimulus meaning. Assuming that we both see a cat I interpret a situational utterance as *prima facie* concerning cats (and not whales). Interpretation refers to what the speakers are mutually *aware* of. (We still have here an indeterminacy of interpretation, but the ongoing interpretation will narrow it down.)

The reference to situations of "verification" (where the truth conditions of some L_1 statement *are met*) as situations of "verification" enables the interpreter to formulate an interpretation axiom (leading to (T)-equivalences).⁴

3) Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", p.73; cf. *ibid.* the counterexample to stimulus meaning.

4) "Verification" is meant here only as justification of using some expression, not as the reduction to some fundament of "the given". Rules of verification are, accordingly, rules of justification.

By means of the conditions of use and the role within the inferential system of the language we correlate the language L_1 with our own language. So the interpreter justifies with scheme (1) why some interpretation axiom and not another has to be formulated. To do this he attributes propositional attitudes (like "being aware of x" or "believing that p") to the L_1 -speakers. To accomplish this he incorporates *normative* assumptions with regard to the L_1 -speakers: to interpret an inferential system of a speaker we have to assume that it is built according to principles that lead from one statement to another, and that it uses principles of deduction. To start with we transfer our logic to L_1 .-

The guiding principles here, as in decision theory, derive from normative considerations....; an interpreter cannot accept great or obvious deviations from his own standards of rationality without destroying the foundations of intelligibility on which all interpretation rests.⁵

Secondly we have to assume awareness of propositional attitudes. For something to be a reason the reasoner must be aware of it, or at least he could bring it to his awareness. Not things (things in themselves or nerve endings) make statements true, but one statement justifies another one.⁶ We interpret the not yet understood speech by assuming with (1) that the statements made are most often true and that they build a coherent system. Without these assumptions understanding would be impossible. Someone who would use expressions arbitrarily would make it impossible to establish a correlation between his manners of usage and situations in the world. If, on the other hand, the use of expressions builds a coherent system, then statements which are supposed to be true will be integrated in the belief system, and statements which turn out to be false will be taken out. To do this speakers have to have propositional (intensional) states. They believe that something is the case, and believe that there are connections between what they believe (inferential relations between statements). And they believe that there are rules determining how the

5) Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth", p.319f., cf. p.325.

6) cf. Davidson, "Empirical Content"; Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth".

expressions of L_1 should be employed. For example that some new circumstances no longer *allow* to speak of an object a being F, since under the new conditions "F" should not be employed. So "F(a)" is re-evaluated. If speakers are able to learn to adjust their belief systems to a changing environment (mediated by their experiences) they have to have second order beliefs about their handling of first order beliefs. To keep their speech coherent they have to know later how they *used to use* an expression in the past. They can only be surprised by a new experience if they *expected* otherwise (i.e. if they can compare expectation with experience). The consideration which statements are affected by the new circumstances and which changes are to be made in the belief system uses as principles of reasoning the semantic rules (rules of meaning) related to these circumstances: conditions to be described in a particular way no longer permit the use of some other expressions. Especially if - according to Davidson's holism - systems of belief as a whole are confronted with new information, the rebuilding cannot be an automatic process of simple statement substitution. We need a rule-governed rebuilding of the system which allows us to test various variants.

In interpreting we consider with (1) the utterances as most often true and try to keep the correspondence with our own beliefs as great as possible by assigning a statement of L_1 a statement of our language L_2 as interpretation that we believe to be true. Only if on occasion this assumption of identity of usage (and thereby of meaning) leads to inconsistencies we ascribe an error to a speaker of L_1 . But the ascription of error presupposes on the side of the interpreter that he makes a difference between the language system of L_1 which the speaker normally is familiar with and his *misusage* of some expression now, in some belief or theory. Without this difference the notion of "error" would make no sense. The interpreter starts with the assumption of the truth of the uttered and distinguishes later on between the interpreted language system (that which should be said in proper usage of that system) and the beliefs of some individual speaker. Deviations from the theory regarding the language system

result out of the individual beliefs of speakers which are not part of the overall system. So the radical interpretation distinguishes between language and theory. And with this distinction an analytic/synthetic distinction might be within reach.

To sum up so far: To judge the coherence of speaking the interpreter has to know what should be said in L_1 under some circumstances. Only so he can put relevant question concerning usage to the speakers (e.g. asking for approval concerning an usage in similar circumstances). By this the radical interpreter has understood the assignment of truth conditions as normative. In formulating the theory of meaning for L_1 he proceeds - presumably in accordance with the L_1 -speakers - on the *maxim*:

- (2) Use the expressions of L_1 under exactly those conditions
which are specified in the (T)-equivalences.

The theory of radical interpretation commits itself, therefore, to the existence and constitutive force of semantic rules in L_1 . The aim of radical interpretation has to be to reconstruct these rules out of linguistic behaviour. The (T)-equivalences should serve this purpose.

§3 Informative and non-informative (T)-equivalences

With regard to the (T)-equivalences, which reconstruct the meaning system of L_1 , we must distinguish non-informative and informative ones. In distinction to

- (3) "p" is true in $L_1 \equiv p$.

there might be *informative* (T)-equivalences. Informative (T)-equivalences are such that on the right hand side of the equivalence another statement is used than the one which is quoted on the left. The right side of an informative (T)-equivalence gives us the truth conditions of a statement "p" in another way than the usage of "p" itself would. We come across informative (T)-equivalences in case we are interested in *explanation*: "Say this 'is a table', since this is a table" is not explanativ, but "Say this 'is a table', since this is a furniture such that..." explains our patterns of usage. Non-informative (T)-equivalences can be understood to assign to a mentioned statement

its extension (i.e. the condition under which the usage would be said to be "correct"). To that extent they are informative with regard to the relationship between the language system L_1 , its usage by L_1 -speakers and the world.⁷ They are non-informative only in the manner in which by the two occurrences of "p" (one time mentioned, one time used) this relationship is explained. Non-informative (T)-equivalences *simulate* correspondence: to the mentioned language system L_1 situations of reference are assigned (by the usage - not quotation - of statements of L_2). The system is made to correspond to the world. So we can say of a coherent theory of meaning of L_1 , with Davidson, that "coherence leads to correspondence". However, we are not only interested in material equivalencies (bi-conditionals), but in a relationship between "p" and reference conditions that covers various situations of language usage. Because of this, Davidson quantifies over speakers and times of speech (i.e. future situations of usage) within the object language.⁸ Equivalencies like (3) don't allow any prognosis about future usage of "p". They only establish equivalence at the spot of applications of (1). Since the interpreter must make a statement about what the interpreted should say (cf. §2), he has to formulate counterfactuals regarding correct L_1 -usage. The interpreter has an interest in going from situational correlation of "p" with q to correlation holding in all circumstances. These correlations are used when a system of belief is rebuilt in the face of new experiences. Therefore Davidson incorporates into (T)-equivalences of non-eternal statements information concerning time, speaker or place. Inasmuch as reference to different space-time-speaker co-ordinates by quantifying over all of them is similar to reference to possible worlds (in some restricted understanding of them), we can formulate the (T)-equivalences with modal notions. We may take the equivalences to be logical equivalences, and quantify in the metalanguage about sets of statements ("possible worlds") to give semantic rules for the modal notions used. We arrive at:

$$(4) \text{ "p" is true in } L_1 \Leftrightarrow q.$$

7) This is empirical information an empirical oriented theory of meaning should be after.

8) cf. Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, p.135.

In some sense of "extensional" we thereby leave Davidson's extensional characterisation of meaning, but extensionality is saved in the metalanguage.⁹

Informative (T)-equivalences, therefore, lead to intensions: we can understand the description of the truth conditions of "p" by another statement even as information about the criteria which justify a usage of "p". Since we want to know when we have to employ some expression we are interested in the explanatory power of informative (T)-equivalences. Informative (T)-equivalences are the means of explicit teaching. According to (2) we should use "p" as the theory of meaning says. The theory of meaning now says that "p" varies with some conditions q. If we know that q is the case, we, therefore, are *justified* in applying "p". Non-informative (T)-equivalences say little to nothing about the criteria of application of "p". They give us extension. Informative (T)-equivalences can be read as giving us the criteria of verification for "p", i.e. intension.¹⁰

This is a basic modification contrary to Davidson's claims. He says of a theory of truth:

9) The intensional *operators and junctors* are reduced to extensionality if we quantify in our metalanguage about possible worlds which are *no more than sets of statements that might be constructed*. Let Σ be a variable for the basis (of atomic statements) of possible worlds. If $F(\Sigma)$ is the set of consequences which are derivable from Σ , which entails only atomic statements, then some statement "p" of the language in question is either true or false in $F(\Sigma)$:

$$V(F(\Sigma), p) = 1 \vee V(F(\Sigma), p) = 0$$

Two statements with the same evaluation are material equivalent in

Σ ($p \equiv q$). We now define:

$$p \Leftrightarrow q \text{ =Df. } (\forall \Sigma)(V(F(\Sigma), p) \equiv V(F(\Sigma), q))$$

Two statements which are equivalent in all possible worlds are logical equivalent. In this sense extensionality can be secured in the metalanguage. But the possibility of elimination of intensional logical constants should not be confused with the (not possible) elimination of the function of correlation between statements and their reference situations *across* varying speech occasions (i.e. some kind of intension). By the way: Davidson's non-informative (T)-equivalences are logical equivalences, since it is not possible for "'p' is true in L_1 ." to be true without "p" being true in L_1 .

10) The set of possible truth conditions on the right side of such an equivalence will be far greater than those which can be operationalized as rules of verification. The aim is to specify most simple epistemic circumstances (e.g. perceptions) for complex referents (e.g. a molecular structure). Furthermore it is not required that a single speaker knows all rules of verification. Putnam's division of labour in case of reference has to play its role here.

The theory reveals nothing new about the conditions under which an individual sentence is true; it does not make these conditions any clearer than the sentence itself does.¹¹

A recursive theory in Davidson's sense, however, has at one time either to presuppose the truth of a counterfactual (T)-equivalence or to give us the means to establish it. The interpreter must be able to discriminate the occurrence of the reference situation of some statement (e.g. to put question to the interpreted at that occasion). He needs criteria to do so. So Davidson says in a later work:

[A theory of truth] also specifies the conditions under which the utterance of a sentence *would* be true if it *were* uttered.¹²

We possess criteria to discriminate the appropriate conditions. These criteria are verification rules for some *other* description of the situation, vis. "q". Informative (T)-equivalences give us meaning (or some approximation to meaning) by logical equivalence. This is still a theory of truth, since the assignment of "true" to any statement has to employ such criteria.

§4 Informative (T)-equivalences and analyticity

We can see radical interpretation as aiming at logical, probably informative (T)-equivalences to reconstruct the theory of meaning of L_1 whereby the speakers of L_1 *should* speak as these equivalences require. So the theory of meaning reconstructs in the metalanguage L_2 the rule system of L_1 . We can understand this as reconstruction of the theory of meaning of L_1 by *constitutive meaning postulates*. Radical interpretation gives us the semantic frame of L_1 . This amounts to a certain Neo-Carnapism which leads to the (re-)introduction of analyticity into L_1 .

11) *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, p.25. Carnap in contradistinction to this reads (T)-equivalencies as truth criteria by necessary and sufficient conditions ("Foundations of Logic and Mathematics", §5).

12) "The Structure and Content of Truth", p.310; my emphasis.

The basic thesis is: *There are analytical statements iff there are rules of semantic usage, and since there have to be rules of semantics, there have to be analytical statements.*

The homolingual theory of truth of L_1 establishes metalinguistically the (T)-equivalences which are true in L_1 (as exhibited by the behaviour of the L_1 -speakers), and because of this some statements of L_1 are analytic. Our attribution of analyticity takes place in the metalanguage. The analytic statements occur within the object language. A statement is analytic because of the semantic rules encoded on the (T)-equivalences:

If we use an expression mentioned on the left hand side of a (T)-equivalence *just in the way* laid down there, this use has to be evaluated as "correct" *according to these rules* of meaning. If we *say* within the object language, by using the expression, that some state of affairs (logically) implies some other (vis. the one described on the right hand side) this will be analytic and a priori. As a paradigmatic case we might consider: If there is a homolingual theory of truth Θ of L_1 :

(5) If $\vdash\text{-}\Theta["F(a) \text{ is true in } L_1 \Leftrightarrow G(a)]$, then it is analytic
in L_1 : $(\forall x)(F(x) \Leftrightarrow G(x))$.

If we say in the metalanguage that a (T)-equivalence is true, it *follows* in the object language that the right side is logically equivalent to the left side. We postulate the truth of the (T)-equivalence in the metalanguage. Since we take the metalanguage and "true in L_1 " as already understood, the mentioned expression on the left side thereby has its meaning reconstructed (or in the case of heterolingual theories of meanings gets its meaning fixed by this). A (T)-equivalence is, of course, not a meaning postulate for the metalanguage but for the object language. The normative character of the (T)-equivalences derives from their being laid down as "true" in the metalanguage (i.e. as something not to be given up) and our principle (2) that we should speak in L_1 according to the (T)-equivalences.¹³

13) We could make this normativity more clear if we gave them imperative force in the first place (using "Mi" for the imperative mood):

In the object language we now have analytic and synthetic statements. In the metalanguage the meaning postulates are also *synthetic*: they say how we assume the object language to be. They derive normative force by (2). Viewed from below (i.e. the object language) we might say that they are *synthetic a priori* since they say what the object language *is*. So there are no synthetic a priori statements within the object language, but if we consider the pair of the object language and its metalanguage we can speak of something like the synthetic a priori. The hierarchy of object and metalanguage explains that there are synthetic statements which are neither conceptually true (as analytic statements) nor in need of "pure intuition" (as Kant's synthetic a priori statements).¹⁴

To sum up: The design of the theory of radical interpretation leads us to the assumption of the existence of analytic statements. To establish the theory of meaning of L_1 is an empirical matter (vis. an interpretation), as Davidson wishes. But if we have established the theory of meaning of L_1 for any historical state of L_1 there are analytic statements because of logical/semantical reasons: According to this theory of meaning there cannot be falsifying models for some statements of L_1 . And these are not only the logically true ones (i.e. the analytic in the "narrow" sense already allowed by Davidson).

With this modification of radical interpretation we don't give up grounding a theory of meaning on linguistic behaviour. The assumption of analytical statements is not empirically weaker than its neglect. Putnam in *The Meaning of "Meaning"* has mocked the assumption of meaning postulates by saying that it won't suffice that

(i) $\text{Mi} \langle \text{"x}_i \text{ is a cat"} \text{ is satisfied by } f_j \text{ in } L_k \Leftrightarrow \text{the } i\text{-th member of } f_j \text{ is a cat} \rangle$

But also in the case of this explicit imperative form we must mark this imperative in the metalanguage as "correct" in all interpretations. So we don't get rid of the background normativity of laying down something in the metalanguage (e.g. by giving an axiom number to it). This normativity is "shown", so to say.

14) This semantic possibility of the Synthetic Apriori is the problem Coffa is after in *The semantic tradition from Kant to Carnap to the Vienna Station* without driving this point home.

someone standing to Carnap in the ancestral relation of being-student-of utters the noise "meaning postulate". We have seen so far that there are some reasons behind these noises. And we might turn *the occurrence* of these noises against Putnam and Davidson, who writes:

Quine revolutionised our understanding of verbal communication by taking seriously the fact, obvious enough in itself, that there can be no more to meaning than an adequately equipped person can learn and observe; the interpreters point of view is therefore the revealing one to bring to the subject.¹⁵

Even if we consider only linguistic behaviour we will see that there are utterances referring to our usage of language, which criticise or explain our sayings. And how could we explain *this* linguistic behaviour without reference to rules? Quine's paradigmatic cases and his starting point, the vocabulary of perception, made it difficult to see this metalinguistic behaviour. Beliefs about rules can also manifest themselves in "ordinary" (1st order) linguistic behaviour: Assume we know some speaker A to be competent in L_1 . If now A speaks to B and utters something that we don't expect of A, since we have come to know A as competent and erring only seldom, this shows that A believes that B believes the rule was different from the proper formulation we have seen A as usually following; or that A believes that B believes that A doesn't know the rule. These higher order assumptions, invoked to explain A as a rational agent, concern the rules of L_1 .¹⁶

§5 The rule-following regress as a problem of semantic holism

We have now explained the meaning of a statement "p" by another statement "q" which describes the truth conditions of "p" in some other fashion than "p" itself does. And we make use of "q" as a criterion in judging the correctness of applying "p". Linguistic descriptions made in L_1 occur in our rules of L_1 . The problem of the regress starts with the simple question, how this other description "q" is rule-governed itself.

15) "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", p.78.

16) cf. Bennett, *Linguistic Behaviour*, §§56f. But Bennett himself believes that this is seldom the case. So he prefers another model (§58).

If another rule is introduced we need another one, and so on. So Wittgenstein, in his discussion of rule-following, considers any solution like semantic holism as inappropriate. Any interpretation would need an interpretation itself, and therefore leaves us hanging in the air.¹⁷ On the other hand, according to Wittgenstein, any behaviour could be made fitting any rule if we just reinterpret the rule, since the rules aren't determined enough.

So we might ask for the alternatives to semantic holism. If semantic holism cannot solve the problem of the regress all that we have said about rule-following and analyticity in §§2-4 won't help us.

§6 Requirements of foundation and avoiding the regress

I will consider two solutions to the regress problem, which are also two interpretations of Wittgenstein: the recourse on some capacity (McGinn's Wittgenstein¹⁸) and the recourse on the praxis of rule-following (Kripke's Wittgenstein¹⁹).

(a)

If one appeals to a capacity of rule-following the regress of rule-following vanishes: We speak the way we speak, since we have a corresponding capacity. This seems to explain nothing. Secondly: Inasmuch as the regress should be avoided the capacity to follow a rule must not be rule-governed itself. Semantic decisionism, however, violates our intuition that we have *reasons* to employ this expression and not another. Wittgenstein says that when we follow a rule, we don't choose.²⁰ And pure naturalism, employing a causal mechanism to solve the problem, stands in danger of giving away on normativity.

(b)

In Kripke's solution, that which determines the correct application of an expression is

17) cf. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §198.

18) cf. McGinn, *Wittgenstein on Meaning*.

19) cf. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rule-Following and Private Language*.

20) cf. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §219.

the common practise of a language community. No rule but “praxis” speaks for itself. Rule-following is specified by a behaviour that accords to the rule. Convergence within the community constitutes the rule in the first place.

But is this an alternative to (a) or to our semantic holism? Instead of a subjective capacity we now have a social habit. But how do I take part in this habit? I seem to need the capacity to participate in the doings of my speech community. Since there are - ex hypothesi - no rules laid down to which I adjust I have to "tune in" to my community. The notion of "praxis" is by itself not clearer than that of "capacity" or that of "rule-following". Even if the conformity within the language community is part of securing the proper application of the semantic rules, it cannot substitute for explicit regulations. A *mere praxis* is not better than any other praxis. In the face of rule scepticism we might even say: How can we distinguish between wrong applications and a change of rule? If we orient ourselves to the majority of the speakers, how is it possible to criticise the majority for an incorrect employment of an expression? Shouldn't we, at least, require that it adheres to its own standards (i.e. rules) of usage so far? The majority might be the institution to change rules, but once it has laid down a rule we should be able to criticise its behaviour with reference to these stipulations. We seem to lose the normativity of rule-following if the majority is in its praxis always right. And the praxis of a community is as re-interpretable as any behaviour - so (b) also leaves the scepticism unrefuted.

These are reasons enough to see whether we don't do better in solving the regress problem *within* semantic holism. The main problem of semantic holism is our intuition of a regress. We can solve it as follows: Because of the holistic procedure of verification (and therefore of meaning something) we are allowed to keep asking for further reasons *in principle*, but in doing so we employ a metarule of *sufficient foundations*:

(6) If there is no founded/reasoned doubt, there is no need for

further foundation/argumentation.

We employ the semantic rules in some situation and try to conform to the habits of our community. If someone asks us why we do so, we explain our usage by reference to the fulfilment of the criteria of use (i.e. some (T)-equivalence). This duty is part of the normativity of meaning. But if in respect to the fulfilment of some criteria of such an argument after n steps there is no longer reasoned doubt (i.e. no foundation of their non-fulfilment), why should we proceed in founding our claims? Our argument now is (relative to all claims founded in the debate) sufficient. Relative to our knowledge of this state of the argument and our knowledge of the rule of meaning it is the optimal logical procedure to evaluate the usage as "correct". All reasons we have now speak in favour of this evaluation. This is neither an act of decisionism nor an act of some capacity, but the application of our rule-following procedures which can be taken up again in principle and has been interrupted, using (6), only at a sufficiently clear point. So the metarule (6) seems to be the lesser evil in comparison to the consequences of (a) and (b). We have *not* overcome the principled problem of the regress, but we can see that it is *harmless* if we employ our rule of sufficient foundation. The regress problem has our intuition of foundation as its driving force. But with respect to our intuitions (6) as a principle that an argument just has to be sufficiently clear seems equally strong. Our pre-understanding of rule-following, therefore, doesn't decide the matter. And all other reasons in our comparison of (a),(b) and semantic holism speak in its favour.

So we can use semantic holism to explain meaning by rule-following, incorporating the rationality assumptions of radical interpretation, and by this we have analytical statements.

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